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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS AND TRADE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CARIBBEAN BASIN
NON-MARKET ECONOMIES, PARTICULARLY CUBA
Roberta Salper*
INTRODUCTION
Support for ideologically diverse and experimental approaches to
development has increased in U.S. policymaking circles since the advent
of the Carter Administration. However, underlying verbal recognition
must be the acceptance of ideological pluralism in both economic and
political affairs.' An examination of the "Prospects for Relations Between
the United States and Caribbean Basin Non-Market Economies, Particu-
larly Cuba" thus becomes, in effect, a specific analysis of the advantages,
deterrents and possibilities involved in moving beyond verbal support for
alternative forms of social and economic development - that is, in
moving from the podium to the negotiating table.
US-CUBAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
Logically, the development of commercial relations between two
countries follows the previous establishment of a political relationship.
Normally, political recognition is secured and the groundwork is laid for
the exchange of ambassadors before attention is focused on economic
issues between the two countries.
Logic therefore would dictate that a paper addressing itself to the
"Prospects for Relations and Trade Between the United States and Cuba"
would first discuss the larger political issue. Trade policy would then be
placed within this broader framework.
Logic, however, has not been the overriding characteristic of US-
Cuban relations for the past nineteen years. So it should not be surprising
that trade policy and future economic relations loom as the major
negotiating obstacles in reestablishing diplomatic relations between the
two countries. The trade embargo levied by the United States, the claim
for U.S. property nationalized by the Cuban government and Cuba's
* Institute for Policy Studies. I would like to thank Kenneth Frankel for his
help in preparing this paper.
1. For a definition of ideological pluralism, see Roberta Salper, Coordinator,
Ad-Hoc Working Group on Latin America, The Southern Connection: Recommen-
dations for a New Approach to Inter-American Relations, Washington, D.C.
(February 1977), pp. 9-14.
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counterclaim for reimbursement for the defense of the Bay of Pigs appear
to be major points of contention which must first be addressed.
Yet, barely two years after Gerald Ford called Fidel Castro "an
international outlaw," there appears to be a softening of previous
hostilities and a greater American desire to change the U.S. policy which
Senator Frank Church has characterized as "petulant and self-
defeating."' 2 Since 1973, U.S. public opinion has increasingly favored the
resumption of negotiations with Cuba and the reestablishment of political
ties. In a recent poll conducted by the Potomac Associates, Americans
favored by a 2-1 margin the resumption of negotiations. 3 As for the
Cubans, they have made it abundantly clear to visiting U.S. Senators,
Congressmen and businessmen that they are desirous of entering into
discussions with our country. 4
Thus, in the ironic setting in which we find ourselves, the U.S.
business community, formerly the staunchest critic of the Castro
government, now constitutes one of the strongest lobbies in favor of
restoring full political and economic ties. Furthermore, many agree with
the Cuban government that President Carter must sign an executive
order lifting the embargo before serious negotiations can take place.
There is a major unifying element to this irony: all parties involved
believe that in the post-Cold War era of detente and economic inter-
change, it is necessary to reexamine the relationship between the United
States and Cuba. Previous economic and political sanctions against Cuba
were based on a geo-political view of the world and an ideological frontier,
both of which have long been eclipsed by contemporary realities. After
almost twenty years of socialist rule, U.S. businessmen and government
leaders alike realize that the Cuban government, like the socialist states
of Eastern Europe, has become institutionalized and has become a
responsible economic and political entity in the global system. As such,
Cuba represents a potential trading partner for the United States.
Specifically, Cuba is eager to buy machinery, fertilizers, corn, wheat,
computers, tractors, medicines and some consumer items.5 In return, the
2. SEN. F. CHURCH, DELUSIONS AND REALITY: THE FUTURE OF UNITED
STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS. Report to the SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
U.S. Sen. p. 8 (Gov't. Printing Off. 1977).
3. W. WATTS & J. DOMINGUEZ, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: OLD ISSUES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS passim (1977).
4. That is, once the embargo is lifted. For a recent statement of the Cuban
position, see Fidel Castro's closing speech at the Second National Assembly of
People's Power in Havana, Cuba (December 24, 1977).
5. Marcelo Fernandez Font, Remarks before the East/West Trade Council
(October 3, 1977) (mimeo distributed by Alamar Associates, Inc., Washington,
October 1977), p. 7.
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island can offer the United States sugar, tobacco, lobster and other
shellfish, citrus fruits and, most importantly, nickel and nickel by-
products. 6 Cuba possesses nine percent of the world's known nickel
resources and the government is actively exploiting and expanding its
operations in this area.7 In making their plea for resumed ties between
the two governments, U.S. businessmen have been quick to note that the
proximity of Cuba will make the delivery of goods to the U.S. consumer
quicker and cheaper than present sources of supply.
8
The United States and Cuba both understand that the new
relationship between them will be substantially different from the one
that existed in 1958. Under the regime of Fulgencio Batista, companies
based in the United States controlled eighty percent of Cuba's utilities,
ninety percent of its mines, forty percent of the sugar cane fields and all of
the oil refining and distribution facilities. In that era, sixty-seven percent
of Cuba's exports went to the United States and seventy percent of its
imports came from this country. The $1.7 billion in exchanged goods
accounted for sixty-four percent of Cuba's trade turnover.9 In addition,
the pearl of the Caribbean and its capital city, Havana, were the
vacationing and nightlife centers for many U.S. tourists.
Cuba, like many other developing nations, views cautiously the
entrance of massive foreign investment. The new approach to foreign
investment is "joint venture" - a concept now in practice in Latin
America and elsewhere. Under a joint venture arrangement, developing
nations attract foreign capital while maintaining control over the use of
the capital. Cuba has established such joint ventures with Japan 10 and
Mexico and has approached various companies about participating in the
development of the Cuban nickel industry."
Since 1960, when the Castro government expropriated all foreign-
owned property ($1.8 billion of which was U.S.-owned), the Cuban
Revolution has been perceived as being rigidly opposed to any direct
foreign investment in the island's economy. However, according to
6. L. Theriot, Cuban Foreign Trade: An Assessment (U.S. Dep't. of Commerce
1978, passim) (Draft of forthcoming publication).
7. T. Moran, The International Political Economy of Cuban Nickel Develop-
ment, 7 CuBAN STUD. passim (July 1977).
8. Interview with Kirby Jones, President of Alamar Associates of Washing-
ton, D.C. (February 1978).
9. L. Theriot, supra note 6, passim.
10. In 1976, Sumitomo Warehouses and the Cuban merchant marine formed a
joint venture called Nippon Caribbean Shipping Company. Based in Tokyo, the
new company is to be the carrier for all seaborn Japanese exports to Cuba. 8 Q.
ECON. REP. (1976).
11. Id., passim.
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Ramon Sanchez Parodi, Chief of the Special Interest Section in
Washington, "We have been able to settle all compensation issues with
our Western European trading partners."' 2 U.S. claims will eventually be
settled in some manner if commercial relations are normalized.
According to a Department of Commerce study in 1978, "[S]hort of
the hard currency investment capital, Cuba has recently appeared to be
more pragmatic about allowing inflows of foreign capital through
techniques different from traditional direct foreign investments."'' 3 Cuba
may follow the lead of other CMEA countries (Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON) which emphasize
various kinds of cooperation arrangements with Western companies. For
example, a Western firm exports a complete plant on credit and then
cooperates in marketing exports from the plant when production starts.
Such an arrangement enhances the countries' ability to obtain credit
financing for hard currency investment projects while minimizing initial
hard currency expenditure. It also provides a way to repay the Western
credit through the export of part of the production of the new facility. The
main attraction for Western companies is the ability to export their
equipment to a market that is inaccessible by normal export techniques or
where cost consideration makes offshore production for export more
economical than in the United States.
Recently, Cuba has suggested forms of cooperation with the United
Kingdom and Canadian and Italian companies in the tourism and
mining sectors. In addition to these cooperation arrangements, Cuba may
also be interested in offshore assembly ventures (called contract
manufacturing in CMEA) in which a finished product is assembled in
Cuba from imported components, both to supply domestic needs and to be
exported.
Cuba has made it explicitly clear that it will closely examine each
trade proposal and transaction involving U.S. dollars. Corporate
investments in Cuba will be accompanied by a high degree of government
involvement with strong stipulations for the amount of profit remittable
to the United States. 14 Yet, despite the knowledge that Cuban trade and
investment laws could be stringent, U.S.-based corporations are more
than eager to involve themselves in a two-way trade that could reach as
high as $600-700 million annually. This would make the United States
12. Seminar group, including the author, at Georgetown University (Feb. 15,
1976).
13. L. Theriot, supra note 6, at 55-56.
14. Id., at 45.
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Cuba's second leading trading partner behind the Soviet Union.15 By
most estimates US-Cuban trade turnover would surpass the total
combined value of all Cuban transactions with the Eastern European
countries.' 6 Since the OAS embargo was modified in 1975 to allow
foreign-based affiliates of U.S. companies to trade with Cuba on a limited
basis, trade has already reached $300 million.
Confident that they can establish mutually beneficial economic
relations with Cuba, many business executives are willing to virtually
ignore past expropriation claims in the hope of expediting the resumption
of ties between the two countries. 17 Already more than 130 companies
have visited Cuba with the intent to test the potential market. Xerox,
FMC Corporation, Abbott Laboratories and the First National Bank of
Chicago are just a few of the firms which have recently sent representa-
tives to Havana.18
Of course, renewed trade relations are not without their potential
dangers. Though Cuba already has firm commitments with some of its
trading partners, most notably the Soviet Union, forty percent of its
present trade is with Western nations. 9 This percentage could increase
significantly when the United States enters the picture. Cuba, leery of
past patterns of U.S. dependency, must be sure that it does not overextend
itself with the United States to the degree that it cannot either buy or sell
contracted goods. 20 While the Soviet Union has and will continue to allow
Cuba to postpone its debt payments, U.S. creditors cannot be expected to
act with the same flexibility.2
1
The renewal of full political and economic ties between the two
countries could prove to be mutually beneficial from a noneconomic
viewpoint as well. As Jorge Dominguez points out, "Science and
technology are among the prime incentives acknowledged by Cuba for
15. L. Theriot, Cuba in CMEA (U.S. Dep't. of Commerce 1977) (unpublished
drafts). See pp. 4-5 and Table 1 in appendix.
16. Id., see Table 1 in appendix.
17. Interview with Wayne Smith, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Dep't of State
(February 1978). According to Mr. Smith, small claimants are not willing to
support a lifting of the trade embargo before the Cubans pay compensatory claims,
whereas many large companies see more prospects for recovering past financial
losses by resuming trade relations.
18. Interview with Kirby Jones, supra note 8.
19. L. Theriot, Cuban Foreign Trade, supra note 6, at 15.
20. However, according to Theriot, Cuban Foreign Trade, pp. 43-44, this
danger does not appear imminent.
21. J. Dominguez, The Cuban Armed Forces and International Order,
(Cambridge, Center for International Affairs) (Harvard University (January
1977)), p. 8.
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improving relations with the United States. '22 Cuba could offer access to
its newly developed labor-intensive technologies and special skills in
maintenance of machinery and equipment particularly relating to the
sugar industry. In addition, a great deal could be learned from Cuba's
successful public health research programs. Other areas of mutual benefit
might be cultural exchanges, tourism, joint weather bureau agreements to
improve meteorological coverage of the Caribbean and collaboration on
marine pollution control, which is severe in the waters between Florida
and Cuba and between Cuba and Central America.
DEVELOPMENT OF US-CUBAN POLITICAL RELATIONS
The first months of the Carter Administration bore witness to a
refreshingly numerous list of positive overtures toward Cuba: a) January
1977: an apparent halt to reconnaissance flights over Cuba; and b) March
1977: a lifting of the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba and of the
prohibition on spending U.S. dollars in Cuba. Subsequently, U.S. travel
agencies received permission to contract with Cuban tourist offices and to
charter aircraft and ships to Cuba, and most recently, direct flights
between the two countries were resumed, and use of U.S. credit cards and
travelers checks in Cuba has been arranged.
For their part, the Cuban government did the following: a) June 1977:
released ten of the remaining thirty U.S. prisoners and announced plans
to review the other cases; b) December 1977: released Frank Emmich,
accused by the Cuban government of being CIA station chief in 1960-61;
c) 1977-78: a resumption of cruise line service between selected ports in
the United States and Cuba, and general receptivity to cultural, scientific
and sports exchanges.
Finally, Cuba and the United States signed two significant bilateral
agreements: a) April 1977: the accords on fishing and maritime rights,
establishing boundaries in the overlapping fishing zones of the two
countries; and b) September 1977: "Interest Sections" opened in
Washington and Havana, housed under the Czech and Swiss flags,
respectively.
Congressional activity, urging a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
dates from the 1971 hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on hijackings which resulted in the Fulbright-Church call for legislation
to repeal the 1962 Cuban Resolution 23 and has been constant to the
22. W. WArs & J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 3, at 47.
23. The OAS affirmed the U.S. initiative in July 1964, by directing all those
member nations which had not already done so to break diplomatic and
commercial relations with Cuba. Kennedy also found authority for the declaration
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present. Activity, however, has subsided during 1977, perhaps waiting for
further signals from the Executive. Congress apparently has lost, or been
urged to relinquish its leadership, in moving for a shift in U.S. policy
toward Cuba. From all observation points it appears that key decisions
regarding the future direction of relations will emanate directly from the
White House.
PROGNOSIS FOR FUTURE COURSE OF US-CUBA RELATIONS
Since the November 1977 Cuban commitment in Africa, the future of
both commercial and political relations between the U.S. and Cuba has
become increasingly linked to Cuba's activity in Africa. Furthermore, I
would suggest that not only is the course of U.S. policy dependent on
Cuban activity in Africa, but also on President Carter's reaction to it.
The Cubans have made it clear that they will not renegotiate the
hijacking agreement, or move to discuss other issues, until the trade
blockade is lifted. As President Castro recently stated,
We don't have any naval bases in the United States. We don't
practice subversion or espionage against the United States. This is
why we believe that it is necessary for the economic blockade to be
lifted before any talks can be held. We believe that this is a very just
position, because we wouldn't get anywhere otherwise. We admit the
possibility of contacts to clear up this position - contacts, not
talks.... This means that we're ready to discuss our problems as
soon as the blockade is lifted.2 4
of the embargo in laws passed by Congress, specifically the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 which authorized the President to establish and maintain an embargo
upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.
The President's proclamation was followed on July 8, 1963 by the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, which prohibit all currency transactions between the
two countries unless licensed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Further authority
for both the Proclamation and the Assets Regulations can be found in the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917 (section 5b) which gives the President very broad
authority to regulate currency "during time of war or any other period of national
emergency declared by the President."
Such legal details are important because they indicate that either the
President or Congress may act unilaterally to end the embargo. Congress may
revoke the authorization for the President to establish the embargo or the
President may simply declare an end to it. (Quoted from CUBA UPDATE, Center for
Cuban Studies, New York City, Feb. 1978, p. 2).
For a comprehensive account of Congressional and Executive actions see
Toward Improved United States-Cuba Relations, Report of a Special Study Mission
to Cuba, Before the House Comm. on Int'l Rel., (1977).
24. Interview in AFRiQUE-AsIE, in Paris (April 23, 1977).
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The Cuban view on its involvement in Africa was clearly spelled out
by Ramon Sanchez Parodi, Chief of the Special Interest Section, in a
seminar at Georgetown University on February 15, 1978:
Our policy toward Africa is different from Cuba's relations with Latin
America .... [I]n 1958, many African colonies were struggling for
independence, and Cuba established relations, early on, with African
liberation struggles .... [T]here was a great deal of world sentiment
to accelerate the decolonization process taking place all over the
globe .... [T]hroughout all these years, a very special and close
relationship between Cuba and many African countries developed.
We both have similar needs: health care, education, housing, etc., and
similar cultural and historical roots create further links. Thus our
close ties and desire to help date back a long time.
Clearly, the Cuban commitment to African struggles is, in essence, not
negotiable. What remains to be seen is its willingness to compromise on
the extent and scope of its involvement.
There is no doubt that several key presidential advisors view
relations with Cuba as being advantageous to this country in the long
run. Furthermore, in forging a new "North-South dialogue" and
advancing the "special relationship" between the United States and
Latin America, Carter promised OAS member countries that the
Administration's approach to Latin America would be based on three
principles: a) a high regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of
each Latin American and Caribbean nation; b) a respect for human
rights; and c) the desire to press forward on the great issues which affect
the relations between the developed and developing nations.
Clearly, if President Carter follows these three basic principles, then
he must reevaluate and eventually change U.S. policy towards Cuba.
Implicit in this new approach, however, is that the Administration will
have to break the Cold War prejudices concerning Cuba and Cuba's
position in the world's geo-political structure. This implies that Cuba will
have to be viewed as a sovereign Latin American nation. As such, Cuban
programs and foreign policies must be respected and seen in their own
context, and within the context of the developing world, the notion that
Cuba is only important to the U.S. vis-A-vis the Soviet Union is outdated.
The respect for the sovereignty of developing nations is not only an
Administration goal but it is a new global tenet.
Whether the U.S. chooses to elaborate a new relationship with Cuba
is still uncertain. Due in large part to the conservative trend in Congress
and to the organized public opposition to liberalization of foreign policy
(as seen in the reaction to the Panama Canal Treaties), there is little
indication that the President will initiate new moves in Cuba's direction
in the upcoming months or during the first term of his administration.
